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I. Introduction
In the problem of hypothesis testing, 'evidence' can be thought of as a post-experimental (data-based) evaluation of the tenability of the null hypothesis, H O • To a Bayesian, evidence takes the form of the posterior probability that H O is true, while to a frequentist, evidence takes the form of the p-value, or significance level, of the test. If the null hypothesis consists of a single point, it has long been known that these two measures of evidence can greatly differ. The famous paper of Lindley (1957) illustrates the possible discrepancy in the normal case.
The question of reconciling these two measures of evidence has been treated in the literature. For the most part, the two-sided (point null) problem has been treated, and the major conclusion has been that the p-value tends to overstate the evidence against H O (that is, the p-value tends to be smaller than a Bayesian posterior probability). Many references can be found in Shafer (1982) . However Pratt (1965) does state that in the one-sided testing problem, the p-value is approximately equal to the posterior probability of H O .
A slightly different approach to the problem of reconciling evidence was taken by DeGroot (1973) . Working in a fairly general setting, DeGroot constructs alternative distributions and finds improper priors for which the p-value and posterior probability match. DeGroot assumes that the alternative distributions are stochastically ordered which, although he does not explicitly state it, essentially puts him in the one-sided testing problem. Dickey (1977) , in the two-sided problem, considers classes of priors, and examines the infimum of Bayesian evidence against H O • As a measure of Bayesian evidence Dickey uses the "Bayes factor," which is closely related to the posterior probability of H O • He also concludes that the p-value overstates the evidence against H O ' even when compared to the infimum of Bayesian evidence.
A recent paper by J. Berger and T. Sellke (1985) has approached the problem of reconciling evidence in a manner similar to Dickey's approach.
For the Bayesian measure of evidence they consider the infimum, over a class of priors, of the posterior probability that H O is true. For many classes of priors it turns out that this infimum is much greater than the frequentist p-value, leading Berger and Sellke to conclude that, II significance levels can be highly misleading measures of the evidence provided by the data against the null hypothesis."
Although their arguments are compelling, and may lead one to question the worth of p-values, their analyses are restricted to the problem of testing a point null hypothesis. If, in fact, the p-value is a misleading measure of evidence, discrepancies with Bayesian measures should emerge in other hypothesis testing situations.
The point null hypothesis is perhaps the most used and misused statistical technique. In particular, in the location parameter problem, the point null hypothesis is more the mathematical convenience rather than the statistical method of choice. Few experimenters, of whom we are aware, want to conclude "there is a difference:' Rather, they are looking to conclude lithe new treatment is better." Thus, for the most part, there is a direction of interest in almost any experiment, and saddling an experimenter with a two-sided test will not lead to the desired conclusions.
In this paper we consider the problem of reconciling evidence in the one-sided testing problem. We find, in direct contrast to the results of Berger and Sellke, that evidence can be reconciled. That is, for many classes of priors, the infimum of the Bayes posterior probability that H O is true is either equal to or bounded above by the p-value.
In Section 2 we present some necessary preliminaries, including the classes of priors we are considering and how they relate to those considered in the two-sided problem. Section 3 contains the main results concerning the relationship between Bayesian and frequentist evidence. Section 4 considers classes of priors that are biased toward H O ' and Section 5 contains comments about testing a point null hypothesis.
Preliminaries
We consider testing the hypotheses
vs.
H l : e > 0 based on observing X = x, where X has location density f(x -e). Throughout this paper, unless explicitly stated, we assume that i) f(.) is symmetric about zero ii) f(x -e) has monotone likelihood ratio (mlr).
Recall that i) and ii) imply that f(·) is unimodal. and allow g(.) to vary within a class of distributions, similar to the classes in (2.4). For any numerical calculations they choose TI O = }, asserting that this provides an impartial prior distribution. We will return to this question in Section 5.
For testing H O : 8 s..0 vs. H l : 8>0, we will mainly be concerned with evidence based on observing x > O. For x < 0, p(x) > } and inf P(Hol x) = }, where the infimum is over any of the classes in (2.4). Thus, if x < 0, neither a frequentist nor a Bayesian would consider the data as having evidence against H O ' so ther is, in essence, nothing to be reconciled.
Syrrmetric Prior Distributions
In this section we consider prior distributions contained in the classes given in (~.4). Our goal is to calculate inf p{HOlx) for each of these classes, and relate the answer to p{x). In some cases we do not calculate inf p{HOlx) exactly, but rather obtain an upper bound on the infimum. This is accomplished by calculating the infimum exactly for smaller classes of distrib.utions.
For the one-sided testing problem, the class G A is too large to be of use, as the following theorem shows. 
o .
and it is easy to see that lim P{Holx) = 0, establishing the result. 0
Although we cannot obtain explicit answers for the class G S ' we can get some interesting results for the smaller class contained in G S ' G 2PS = {all two-point distributions sYmmetric about a}. For TI£G 2PS ' we have TI(e) =~if e = +k, and hence
Since f has mlr, it follows that, for x > 0, P(Holx) is decreasing in k. Therefore, for x > 0,
he following theorem establishes that p(x) quantity.
( 3.2) is an upper bound on this Proof: The inequality
To establish (3.3), it suffices to establish the weaker inequality,
Let xl = k-x, x 2 = k+x, 6 1 = 0, and 6 2 = k-z. The integrand is of the form f(X l -6 1 )f(X 2 -6 2 ) -f(x2-61)f(x,-62). Since x > 0, x 2 > xl' and 6 2~61 if and only if k~z. Thus the fact that f has mlr implies that the integrand is nonnegative if z~k and nonpositive if z > k.
It also folbws from the assumptions on f that lim f(k-x) = lim f(k+x) exists k-joOO k-joOO and equals zero. (3.6) the last inequality following since f is unimodal and x > O. Thus, by the dominated convergence theorem,
establishing (3.4) and proving the theorem. 0 (3.7) (3.8)
The inequality between inf p(HOlx) and p(x) is, in fact, strict in 7fE: G 2PS in many cases. Table 1 gives explicit expressions for some common distributions.
The Cauchy distribution, which does not have m£r, does not attain its infimum at k = 00 but rather at k = (x 2 +1)1/2. Even so, it is still the case that the p-value is greater than inf p(HOlx) for the Cauchy distribution. We now turn to the class of distributions GUS' where we again obtain the p-va1ue as an upper bound on the infimum of the Bayesian evidence. We can, in fact, demonstrate equality between p(x) and inf P(Holx) for two classes of distributions contained in GUS. We first consider Us = {all symmetric uniform distributions}. ...
We will now establish that P{Holx), as a function of k, has no minimum on the interior of (O,oo) . Suppose k = k O satisfies (3.ll) It is straight forward to establish that the sign of the second derivative, evaluated at k = kO' is given by
Since f has mlr, the ratio f(x+k)/f{x-k) is decreasing in k for fixed x > O.
Therefore, the sign of (3.12) is always negative, so any interior extremum can only be a maximum. The minimum is obtained on the boundary, and it is straightforward to check that tf {x-e)de Proof: Let '1T(e)E:Gr~u. By interchanging the order of integration and using the symmetry of f we obtain
We first show that, for fixed g, inf P(Holx) = lim P(Holx) 0<0<00 We can summarize the results of the above two theorems, and the relationship to GUS in the following corollary. This corollary is in striking contrast to the results of Berger and Sellke (1985) . In the two sided problem with a point null hypothesis, they argued that using impartial prior distributions does not lead to any reconciliation between inf P{Holx) and p{x). In fact, for the cases they considered, the Bayesian infimum was much greater that p{x). In contrast, we find that for classes of reasonable, impartial priors, such as G MU ' we obtain equality between inf P{Holx) and p{x), showing that, in fact, p{x)
is a conservative measure of evidence against the null hypothesis.
We close this section by examining two important special cases. In the first case we again obtain equality between p(x) and P(Holx). We next consider the Cauchy distribution, to again examine the situation when the assumption of mlr does not obtain. For the class Us' the symmetric uniform distributions, we calculate inf P(Holx) where f(x-e) = [7T(1+(x_e)2)]-1.
For 7T(e) = Uniform (-k,k) and it is straightforward to calculate
For fixed x > 0, P(Holx) is not monotone in k, but rather attains a unique minimum at a finite value of k. Table 2 lists the minimizing values of k, inf P(Holx), and the p-value for selected values of x.
Examination of Table 2 shows once again that inf P(Holx) is smaller than p(x), this observation held true for more extensive calculations that are not reported here. Therefore, even in the case of the Cauchy distribution, the infimum of the Bayesian measure of evidence is smaller than the frequentist p-value. 
Biased Prior Distributions
In this section we examine two cases where the prior distributions are biased toward H O ' and begin to see some of the reasons for the large discrepancies between Bayesian and frequentist evidence in the two-sided case.
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Again consider H O : e < a vs. H l : e > a where X -n(e,a ),a known.
Consider the class of priors
The class G e is clearly biased toward H O ' however, if we calculate a inf p(Holx) over this class the result is again p(x).
For any TI£G e ' it is easy to calculate a P(Holx) = P(Z < -(~/a2 1 x +~/'[2 k eo)) ,
where Z -n(O,l). For x > 0, P(Holx) is a decreasing function of '[2, so the infimum is attained at '[2 = 00:
The effect of the bias for H O is diminished at '[2 increases, resulting in a limit which is independent of eO' This is a different situation from the point-null case, where the prior probability on the point null is unaffected by any limiting operation.
We next consider a family of priors in which every member is biased toward H O by the same amount. Suppose that an experimenter is willing to assert, for every k > 0, it is q times more likely that e£(-k,O} than e£(O,k}. This belief may be reflected in the prior Table 3 .
For small m, q is approximately equal to m. However for larger values of m, q increases rapidly, showing that the prior must be very biased toward H O in order to achieve a large increase in inf P(Holx). To a Bayesian, the fact that evidence can be reconciled with the p-values allows for a Bayesian interpretation of a p~value and the possibility of regarding a p-value as an objective assessment of the probability that H O is true. It also, to a Bayesian, gives the p-value a certain amount of respectability. To a frequentist, the p-value (or significance level) has long been regarded as an objective assessment of the tenability of H O ' an interpretation that survives even within the Bayesian paradigm.
